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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

BRAD HAMMOND,

:

Case No. 20010915-CA

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the trial court's imposition of three
consecutive sentences of zero-to-five years in the Utah State
Prison for two counts of possession or use of a controlled
substance and one count of possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, all third degree felonies.

This Court

has appellate jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court abuse its discretion either by failing
to consider certain statutory factors or by inadequately weighing
them prior to imposing consecutive sentences?
A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial
court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all legally
relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally
1

prescribed limits.

st-ate v. Gihhons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah

1989)(citations omitted).

The Utah Supreme Court has noted that

"the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects
the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can
properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court."

State

v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401, governing concurrent and
consecutive sentences, provides in pertinent part:
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant
has been adjudged guilty of more than one
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent
or consecutive sentences for the offenses.
Sentences for state offenses shall run
concurrently unless the court states in the
sentence that they shall run consecutively.

(4) A court shall consider the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses and the
history, character, and rehabilitative needs
of the defendant in determining whether to
impose consecutive sentences.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1), -401 (4) (1999) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of distributing or
arranging to distribute a controlled substance (methamphetamine),
a second degree felony (R. 1-2). He eventually pled guilty to
one count of possession or use of a controlled substance, a third

2

degree felony (R. 12-19).

At sentencing, the trial court

considered the charge in this case as well as two other drugrelated third degree felonies to which defendant had pled in
another case (R. 26-27, R. 49 at 2). The court then sentenced
defendant to three consecutive terms of zero-to-five years in the
Utah State Prison (R. 26, R. 49 at 3). Defendant filed a motion
for review of the sentence to clarify the reasons underlying the
consecutive sentences (R. 28-29).

After a hearing on the matter,

the court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law,
reaffirming its decision to impose consecutive sentences (R. 3335 at addendum A ) . Defendant filed this timely appeal (R. 37).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The undisputed facts, taken in their entirety from the
court's findings of fact, are as follows:
1. A guilty plea of Illegal Possession or
Use of a Controlled Substance, a third degree
felony has been entered in case number
0011300257 on August 27, 2001. i1]
2.
A second guilty plea of Possession with
Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance,
a third degree Felony has been entered in
case number 0011300257 on August 27, 2001.
3. A third guilty plea of Illegal Possession
or Use of a Controlled Substance, a third
degree felony has been entered in case number

1

The charges listed in the first two findings of fact
arose from a no-knock search warrant executed on defendant's home
on June 8, 2001 (PSR at 3).
3

0011300256 on August 27, 2001. [2]
4. On October 10, 2001, the defendant
objected to the Presentence Investigation
Report as having errors.
5. On October 17, 2001, the Court accepted
Defendant's objections to the PSI and noted
that defendant was instrumental in enabling
his son to become involved in the drug
culture.
6. The Court further noted that the
defendant has a significant drug problem and
did not appear amenable to probation.
7. The Court, having heard from the
defendant and the defendant's demeanor [sic]
concluded that the defendant should not be
placed upon probation and the defendant was
likely to continue violating the law and was
a danger to the community.
8. The recommendation of Adult Probation and
Parole suggested that a diagnostic evaluation
would be appropriate.
9. Defendant refused to participate in a
sixty day diagnostic evaluation at the Utah
State Prison.
(R. 34-35 at addendum A).

Based on these undisputed facts, the

court then sentenced defendant to three consecutive terms of zero
to five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 33 at addendum A ) .
The court also levied a fine of $1500 and fees of $1275 (Id.) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues either that the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering consecutive sentences without considering

2

This is the charge in the current case, which arose from
a controlled buy at defendant's home on June 4, 2 001 (PSR at 2) .
4

certain statutory factors or, alternatively, that it considered
those factors inadequately.

Defendant has not demonstrated that

the trial court failed to consider the factors.

First, the

record reflects that the sentencing court had before it
information addressing defendant's criminal history, and the
court specifically acknowledged having considered it.

Second,

because defendant himself, by consciously declining a diagnostic
evaluation, precluded the court from accessing information about
his rehabilitative needs and appropriate sentencing alternatives,
he cannot now complain that the court failed to consider that
factor.

Similarly, he cannot argue that his counsel's failure to

advocate for concurrent sentences constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel where, through declining a diagnostic
evaluation, he precluded the court from accessing the very
information on which his counsel could conceivably have advocated
for leniency.
Alternatively, as to weighing the statutory factors, that is
the job of the trial court, which was in the best position to
make the highly individualistic assessment inherent in the
sentencing decision.

While defendant may have weighed the

factors differently, it cannot be said that no reasonable person
would have agreed with the sentencing court.

Consequently, the

court did not abuse its considerable discretion by imposing
consecutive sentences.

5

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION BY FAILING TO CONSIDER
CERTAIN STATUTORY FACTORS OR BY
IMPROPERLY WEIGHING THEM PRIOR TO
IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES
Defendant's argument on appeal is not clear.

Either he is

arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering
consecutive sentences without giving adequate weight to several
of the statutory factors specified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3401(4) (1999), or he is arguing that the court abused its
discretion by not considering those factors at all.
App. at 6-7.

See Br. of

In either case, defendant asserts that the court

acted out of anger and ordered consecutive sentences to punish
defendant for declining a diagnostic evaluation prior to
sentencing (R. 6-7, 8).
Neither of defendant's two possible arguments has merit.
Section 76-3-401 of the Utah Code, governing the trial court's
authority to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, directs
the court to "consider the gravity and circumstances of the
offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of
the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive
sentences."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4).

A trial court may

thus abuse its discretion if it imposes consecutive sentences
without considering the statutory factors, which are all legally
relevant to the sentencing determination.

6

See, e.g., State v.

McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990); State v. Montova. 929
P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996).

To prevail on appeal, the

defendant must affirmatively show that "the trial court failed to
consider the appropriate factors." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,
Kl5, 40 P.3d 626.3
If defendant is asserting that the sentencing court did not
consider either his history or his rehabilitative needs before
imposing consecutive sentences, he has failed to make the
required showing.

The presentence investigation report contains

a full criminal history as well as a personal history, including
defendant's family situation, employment history, drug and
alcohol history, and present living situation.
9.

See PSR at pp. 5-

The trial court explicitly stated that it had reviewed the

report prior to sentencing.

See Tr. of 11/13/01 at 3-5 or

addendum B; cf. Helms, 2002 UT 12 at f 11 ("we will not assume
that the trial court's silence, by itself, presupposes that the
court did not consider the proper factors as required by law");
State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah App. 1997)(defendant
did not show that the trial court failed to consider statutory

3

The sentencing court, however, is not bound to enter
specific findings to justify its consecutive sentencing order,
although the record must contain evidence from which such
findings could be reasonably made. Helms, 2002 UT 12 at ff 11,
17 (citations omitted).
7

factors where the record contained mitigating evidence).4
The record demonstrates that the trial court acted within
the ambit of its discretion in ordering consecutive sentences.
At the clarification hearing, the court noted that defendant had
"decided to get pretty actively involved in the drug business"
(Id.).

The court stated:
I'll tell you, really, what my thinking was
at the time [of sentencing]. I have had your
son in this Court and I believe that you have
had a corrupting influence on him and others
around you. Your age and circumstance tell
me you ought to have a little more maturity
than what you were doing in the criminal
effort here. And I thought that consecutive
sentences were appropriate to you because of
your circumstances and your willingness to be
involved in crime.

Tr. of 11/13/01 Hearing at 4.

This statement reflects the

court's serious concern with the kind of ties defendant had with
his "community" and with his own familial influence.

While

defendant had only one other drug charge in his criminal history,
the record indicated that he was a high risk because of his "drug
and alcohol abuse, sporadic employment and attitude."

PSR at 9.

Moreover, his active level of involvement with "the drug
business" was plainly attested to by his two arrests within five

4

Moreover, after the court had ordered consecutive
sentences, defendant requested a hearing to clarify the sentence
(R. 28-29). At that hearing, the court reassured defendant that
errors in the presentence investigation report had been noted
prior to sentencing (Tr. of 11/13/01 Hearing at 5). Thus, no
extraneous factors influenced the sentencing decision.
8

days for multiple drug-related felonies.

Id. at 2-3.

Finally,

defendant had been a fugitive from justice for over two months
when he was apprehended, a factor which no doubt did little to
enhance his standing with the court.

Id. at 3.

In addition, the court cited to defendant's refusal to
participate in a diagnostic evaluation with the Department of
Corrections, observing, "You said you didn't feel that would be
beneficial and you know what your circumstances are."
11/13/01 Hearing at 5.

Tr. of

Defendant's refusal to participate in a

diagnostic evaluation significantly influenced the court's
sentencing decision, although not for the punitive reason
defendant suggests.5
A diagnostic evaluation is an important tool available to a
court when it is "of the opinion [that] imprisonment may be
appropriate but desires more detailed information as a basis for
determining the sentence to be imposed than has been provided by
the presentence report."
(1999).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404(1)(a)(i)

By exercising its discretion in favor of this evaluative

tool, the court was plainly seeking more in-depth information
5

Defendant contends that the sentencing court "punished"
his refusal to participate in a diagnostic evaluation by ordering
that his sentences run consecutively (Br. of App. at 5-6, 8).
This contention, however, is purely speculative, both lacking in
record support and requiring an unreasonable inferential leap.
As such, it fails from the outset. Cf. Fernandez v. Cook, 870
P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)("proof of ineffective assistance of
cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable
reality").
9

about "the rehabilitative resources or programs . . . available
to suit [defendant's] needs."

Id. at section 76-3-

404(1) (a) (ii) (E) . Defendant's affirmative choice not to
participate in this information-gathering process thus bars him
from asserting on appeal that the court did not adequately
consider his rehabilitative needs.

State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d

1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991)(discussing invited error doctrine).6
Moreover, the court was well within its discretion in considering
defendant's obstructionist attitude as a factor in its decision
to order consecutive sentences.

See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,

939 (Utah 1994)(sentencing court's assessment of defendant's
character may be based, at least in part, on the court's personal
observation of defendant's body language, demeanor, and tone of
voice).
Because the record indicates that the sentencing court had
before it information addressing defendant's history, the court
did not abuse its discretion by failing to consider that factor.
Helms, 2002 UT 12 at fll. And because defendant himself

6

For the same reason, defendant's assertion of ineffective
assistance
of counsel must fail. He cannot claim that his
counsel performed deficiently when, by his own affirmative
action, he precluded access to the very information on which his
counsel might have based an argument that he merited concurrent
sentences or that rehabilitation should rightly take precedence
over punishment. That is, where defendant makes a strategic
choice at trial, he is precluded from arguing on appeal that the
result of that choice stemmed from ineffective assistance of
counsel. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989).
10

precluded the court from accessing specific information about
appropriate rehabilitative resources and programs, he cannot now
complain that the court failed to consider that factor.

Perdue,

813 P.2d at 1205.
Alternatively, if on appeal defendant is arguing that the
trial court abused its discretion by according certain statutory
factors insufficient weight in fashioning an appropriate
sentence, that argument must also fail.

The trial court, not an

appellate court, is plainly in the most advantaged position to
make the highly individualistic assessments required in
sentencing decisions.

See State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671

(Utah 1997)(sentencing "necessarily reflects the personal
judgment of the court'') . In deciding the appropriateness of a
particular sentence, a trial court must consider many
intangibles, such as the defendant's "character, personality, and
attitude, of which the cold record gives little inkling."

State

v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957); see also State v.
McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980).

Also within the

court's discretion is the determination that punishment for the
crime should take precedence over rehabilitation.

See State v.

Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993)("trial court did not
abuse its discretion by placing more emphasis on punishing
defendant rather than rehabilitating him").

Where the trial

court here had a direct opportunity to weigh all the factors

11

contributing to its assessment of defendant's credibility, that
judgment and the resultant weight accorded each of the sentencing
factors should not be revisited by a reviewing court armed only
with a "cold record."

See, e.g., Woodland, 945 P.2d at 671;

Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393.
Under the circumstances of this case, while defendant did
not agree with the court's sentence, it cannot be said that "no
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial
court."

State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).

Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
consecutive prison terms.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
consecutive sentences for three counts of possession or use of a
controlled substance, all third degree felonies.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2^. d a Y

of

June, 2002.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General

12

CERTIFICATE OP MaTT.TMG
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage
prepaid, to Julie George, attorney for appellant, 32 Exchange
Place, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this j£*day of
June, 2 002.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

" W O DISTRICT COURT
^djudlc/a/ Dfctrlct
David C. Cundick (4817)
Deputy Tooele County Attorney
47 South Main
Tooele, UT 84074
Telephone: 801-843-3120

7X

ey-

*»?COUNTY
Deputy Cleric"

T H I R D DISTRICT C O U R T
IN A N D FOR T O O E L E COUNTY, S T A T E OF U T A H
THE STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintifT,
vs.
BRAD HAMMOND,

)
1 FINDINGS OF FACT AND
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
)
> Case No. jfol 1300256

Defendant.

On October 22,2001, this matter came on for sentencing before the Honorable David
S. Young. The defendant was present and represented by his counsel, Doug Hogan. The State was
represented by David C. Cundick, Deputy Tooele County Attorney. The Court, having heard from
the respective parties and having heard from the defendant individually now makes the following,
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. A guilty plea of Illegal Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony
has been entered in case number 0011300257 on August 27, 2001.

1

00035

2. A second guilty plea of Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a third
degree Felony has been entered in case number 0011300257 on August 27, 2001.
3. A third guilty plea of Illegal Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a third degree
felony has been entered in case number 0011300256 on August 27, 2001.
4. On October 10, 2001, the defendant objected to the Presentence Investigation Report as
having errors.
5. On October 17,2001, the Court accepted Defendant's objections to the PSI and noted that
defendant was instrumental in enabling his son to become involved in the drug culture.
6. The Court further noted that the defendant has a significant drug problem and did not
appear amenable to probation.
7. The Court, having heardfromthe defendant and the defendant's demeanor concluded that
the defendant should not be placed upon probation and the defendant was likely to continue violating
the law and was a danger to the community.
8. The recommendation of Aduh Probation and Parole suggested that a diagnostic evaluation
would be appropriate.
9. Defendant refused to participate in a sixty day diagnostic evaluation at the Utah State
Prison

2

C 0n 3 4

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the defendant is hereby sentenced 0-5 years at
the Utah State Prison on each of the third degree felonies. Said convictions are to run consecutively,
one after the other.
Defendant is ordered to pay afineof $500 on each of the third degree felonies for a total fine
of $1500.
Defendant is further ordered to pay a surcharge in the amount of $425 on each of the third
degree felonies for a total surcharge of $1,275.
Dated this

/ J ^ " day of November, 2001.
Y THE COURT:

David S. Yo
Third Distric
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

L. Douglas Ho^drfl Attorney for Defendant

3
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ADDENDUM B

question, Mr. Hogan?
MR. HOGAN:

I don't, your Honor.

I believe my

client would like to address the Court.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. HOGAN:

I'd—I'd just like to state that the

purpose for the filing of this motion, your Honor, I was
contacted by my client after—after sentencing and he wished
some further information with regards to imposition of
consecutive sentences;—
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

MR. HOGAN:

—therefore, the motion was filed.

And

he's had a chance just now to review the—the findings, I had
a chance to review them and I believe that he'd like to ask
your Honor—
THE COURT:

Yes, Mr. Hammond?

MR. HAMMOND:

Your Honor, I would just request that

I possibly have my sentence be changed to concurrent.
THE COURT:
sentenced you.

I—I decline to do that.

I've already

Is there anything that I didn't know then that

you think I should know?
MR. HAMMOND:

I just—I don't know if you have

reviewed the—the amended P.S.I, o r —
THE COURT:

I had, at that time.

If you're talking

about today, is it your impression that there is a second
amended P.S.I.?

3

MR. HAMMOND:
THE COURT:

Oh, no. No.
Okay.

Yeah.

I had reviewed it at that

time.

I'll tell you, really, what my thinking was at the

time.

I have had your son in this Court and I believe that

you have had a corrupting influence on him and others around
you.

Your age and circumstance tell me you ought to have a

little more maturity than what you were doing in the criminal
effort here.

And I thought that consecutive sentences were

appropriate to you because of your circumstances and your
willingness to be involved in crime.
MR. HAMMOND:
THE COURT:

So, that's the deal.

All right.
Exactly what I felt.

Okay?

Do you

understand?
MR. HAMMOND:

Yeah.

I just—I went for an extended

period, you know, with no criminal conduct or no arrests, I
don't know if any of that had been considered o r —
THE COURT:

That was all considered.

That was all

part of—-I had—I had a copy, in fact, let me go to it and
tell you what I have in terms of the P.S.I.

I had the—the

P.S.I., I had the—an updated memorandum that was dated
October 17th, supplemented to it.

I'm fully aware that—if I

recall, it was not recommended—it was—A P & P did—did not
necessarily recommend consecutive sentences, if my
recollection is correct, but I did it.
It's respectfully recommended by Adult Probation &

4

Parole that Mr. Hammond be referred to the custody of the
Department of Corrections for a diagnostic.
the diagnostic, you'll recall that.

And you declined

You said you didn't feel

that would be beneficial and you know what your circumstances
are.
And so—and I knew that your—I knew there were
errors in the original report, because I have written, "not
this defendant", "not this defendant1', "not this defendant",
on the registration violation, the reckless driving and the
forcible sexual abuse, those were not yours; so I knew those
were being excluded.
And that took out a period of time from 1990 to '91
and '96, actually, and your criminal involvement was in '79
and '82 and '86 and then again in this present offense.
MR. HAMMOND:
THE COURT:

Uh huh.
But it was my view that you decided to

get pretty actively involved in the drug business and that the
circumstances of this case justified a consecutive sentence.
You do know that the Board of Pardons has the right
to change any of that sentence based upon your institutional
performance.

You know that?

MR. HAMMOND:
THE COURT:
MR. HAMMOND:
THE COURT:

No, I didn't know that.
Do you know what that means?
I wasn't aware of that.
Yeah.

The Board of Pardons—the Board

5

1

of Pardons can—I mean, the Board of Pardons could determine

2

that you can be released tomorrow, if they felt that that was

3

justified, that's the power they have; now, I'm sure they

4

won't do that and you know that as well as I do.

5

Board can do that, I'm just going to initial that I opened

6

this.

7

I'm not familiar with, but frequently, if you have no write-

8

ups in the institution in a period of one year, you can

9

petition the Board for reconsideration of your status and—and

10

But the—the

And—and they have regulations which, the recent ones

they can make decisions about that.

11

You have the benefit of working your way out of

12

prison sooner than a consecutive sentence would otherwise make

13

it.

That's up to you.

14

MR. HAMMOND:

All right.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. HAMMOND:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. HAMMOND:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. CUNDICK:

21

THE COURT:

22

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

It's up to you.
Thank you.
Any questions?
Thank you for your time.
All right.

Thank you, your Honor.

All right.

23
24
25

Thank you.

* **

You're welcome.

